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Climbing Mount Mitigation:
A Proposal for Legislative Suspension of
Climate Change "Mitigation Litigation"
J.B. Ruhl*

1

Because it’s there.

To me, the only way you achieve a summit is to come back alive. The job is
half done if you don't get down again.2
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1
In March 1923, in an interview with The ew York Times, the British
mountaineer George Leigh Mallory gave this response when asked why he wanted to
climb Mount Everest, which no person had successfully accomplished. The answer
became famous, particularly after Mallory and his fellow climber Andrew Irvine were
lost on Everest in the following year. It was unclear whether they perished on the way up
to or down from the summit. See Interview, Climbing Mount Everest is Work for
Supermen,
N.Y.
TIMES, March
18,
1923,
at
X11,
available
at
http://www.askoxford.com/worldofwords/quotations/quotefrom/mallory?view=uk (last
visited November 5, 2009).
2
In May 1999, Mallory’s body was found on Everest, reigniting the question of
whether or not he or Irvine had reached the summit 29 years before Sir Edmund Hillary's
successful climb. Mallory's son, John Mallory, offered this objective view of the
implications of the finding of his father’s body. See AskOxford.com, A Quote from
George Leigh Mallory, http://www.askoxford.com/worldofwords/quotations/quotefrom/
mallory/?view=uk (last visited November 5, 2009).
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I. Introduction
What is the United States’ climate change policy? Nobody knows. To
be sure, there is plenty of talk and even some action, the latter mostly by
states with the federal government moving slowly behind,3 but there could
be no plausible claim that the United States, and by this I mean federal,
state, local, tribal, and private actors from top to bottom—has formulated
anything approaching a coherent, integrated, multi-scalar national climate
change policy.4
Formulating such a policy, even with what appears to be new-found
political will at all governance levels, will be no mean feat. Critical and as
yet unanswered questions are most pressing at the federal scale: How will
U.S. policy interface with international and other national regimes? What
form should comprehensive federal legislation take—cap and trade,
carbon taxes, regulation, subsidies, something else? Should federal
initiatives promote or preempt state and local climate change policies? All
these questions, however, focus on federal policy initiatives taken through
new laws and new regulations implementing them.
This Article focuses on a different but related fundamental policy
design question: How should federal agencies implement existing statutory
authorities to contribute to a coherent national climate change policy?
One might ask why we should be concerned with how existing laws can
be employed given reasonable expectations that the Obama
Administration and Congress are poised to make gains on new federal
initiatives. For several reasons, however, it is unlikely that even bold new
federal legislation—a comprehensive carbon tax on all fossil fuel
consumption or a cap-and-trade program broadly encompassing major
emission sources—will obviate the need to solve the puzzle of how to
integrate existing laws into the picture. First, it is unlikely that new
3

See Patrick A. Parenteau, Lead Follow or Get Out of the Way: The States Tackle
Climate Change with Little Help from Washington, (July 23, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1438180 (surveying the efforts
of various states on climate change).
4
See Geoffrey Clemm & Mark Griffin Smith, Emerging U.S. Climate Change
Policy: Where We are and How We Got Here, (April 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440339 (surveying the history and current
landscape of national climate change policy).
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federal legislation aimed at reducing national greenhouse gas emissions
will alone allow us to meet our nation’s appropriate share (whatever that
is) of global reductions necessary to wrestle climate change under control
(whatever that level is). Second, regardless of how aggressively the
federal government regulates greenhouse gas emissions through some new
legislative program, the global climate system will face a period of
“committed warming” resulting from the buildup of past emissions in the
troposphere.5 In short, something more than new federal emission
reduction programs will be needed to reduce emissions (known as
mitigation), and something entirely different from emission reduction
programs will be needed to respond to the climate change we inevitably
will experience regardless of mitigation success (known as adaptation).6
As we look around for that something more, new state and local policy
initiatives surely come to mind as ways to fill the gap, but why not also
turn to existing federal environmental and other legislation? Of course, for
close to a decade some federal agencies, many interest groups, and a
growing number of legal academics have been doing just that, but not in
any systematic way. Our federal “policy” for how to employ existing
legislative authorities such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act,
Endangered Species Act, and National Environmental Policy Act to
combat and respond to climate change has been shaped primarily by ad
hoc agency policy studies, scatter-shot interest group litigation aimed at
forcing agencies to do something or to prevent them from doing anything,
and all variety of proposals in legal scholarship, which is to say there is no
5

See V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic
Interference with the Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 105, 14245 (2008) (estimating committed
warming of 2.4oC even if greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan
Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106
PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 1704 (2009) (estimating a 1000-year committed
warming effect); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC],
SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, at 19, Cambridge
University Press, (April 2–5, 2007); available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf (“Past emissions are estimated to involve some
unavoidable warming . . . even if atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations remain at
2000 levels.”); Professor Eric Biber has provided an in-depth examination of this lag
effect and the resistance it is likely to generate against costly policy measures that may
take decades to produce results. See Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295 (2009) ().
6
Broadly speaking, in the language of climate change policy mitigation means
polices designed to arrest climate change and adaptation means policies designed to deal
with the climate change we either do not or cannot mitigate. See generally, Robin Kundis
Craig, Climate Change Comes to the Clean Water Act: ow What? (discussing the terms
mitigation and adaptation in terms of the distinct policy needs and approaches of each);
see also Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead” – Long Live Transformation: Five
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/=1357766 (outlining general guidelines for
formulating adaptation strategies).
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policy at all. It is thus little surprise that the EPA Office of Inspector
General recently found that “EPA does not have an overall plan to ensure
developing consistent, compatible climate change strategies across the
Agency.”7 I leave it to others to assign blame for that lack of cohesive
federal policy initiatives on climate change to date. The Obama
Administration presents opportunities for a fresh start, and my aim here is
to put existing federal regulatory programs at the heart of any effort the
Administration activates to forge a comprehensive national climate change
policy.
Three overarching concerns strike me as complicating and
constraining the role of existing authorities in that regard. First, at least
for the foreseeable future agencies most likely will have to rely on existing
legislation as currently in place to define the scope of authority. Congress
is unlikely soon in any systematic and comprehensive way to “update”
existing legislation to take climate change mitigation and adaptation goals
into account. For one thing, the political game in Congress on climate
change for now, if there is one, is about enacting new comprehensive
emission reduction legislation. But even with that task eventually behind
it, Congress is likely to take up the Supreme Court’s suggestion in
Massachusetts v. EPA8 that existing legislation can be sufficiently flexible
to accommodate development of climate change mitigation and adaptation
policy through administrative reform initiatives.9 Why would Congress
7

U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REP. NO. 09-P0089, EPA NEEDS A COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH PLAN AND POLICIES TO FULFILL ITS
EMERGING CLIMATE CHANGE ROLE, AT A GLANCE (2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2009/20090202-09-P-0089.pdf.
8
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)
(holding that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had erred in denying a citizen
rulemaking petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles as an air
pollutant under the Clean Air Act). See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000)
(defining “air pollutant” in sweeping terms to include “any air pollution agent . . .
including any physical, chemical [or] biological . . . substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”). The EPA dismissed the petition on the broad
basis that global climate change is so complicated either Congress did not provide for
greenhouse gas emissions to be subject matter for the Clean Air Act or, if Congress did
so provide, the agency properly identified conflicting policy concerns as a basis for
deciding not to regulate emissions. See Control of Emissions from New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52922, 52929–31 (Sept. 8, 2003). The Court rejected
those rationales as outside the scope of the statute and found that “greenhouse gasses fit
well within [the] capacious definition” of air pollutant. 549 U.S. at 500. For concise yet
thorough summaries of the rulemaking petition, the EPA’s decision, lower court
proceedings, the Supreme Court’s majority and dissenting opinions, and the likely impact
of the case, see Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Controlling Greenhouse Gas Emissions From
Mobile Sources – Massachusetts v. EPA, 37 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10535
(2007); see also Michael Sugar, Case Comment, Massachusetts v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 531 (2007).
9
See 549 U.S. at 532 (“While the Congresses that drafted [Clean Air Act] might
not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global
warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances
and scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad
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expend the political capital necessary to update the laws if agencies can
accomplish the same through administrative interpretation and
implementation of existing laws?
Leaving matters to agencies, however, raises the two additional
concerns: What is the scope of agency discretion under existing laws to
formulate mitigation and adaptation policies, and how aggressively should
any such authority be exercised? Appallingly, these two root questions are
being addressed only through piecemeal interest group litigation and
disjointed agency policy initiatives. The time, thus, is ripe for the Obama
Administration to conduct a systematic, government-wide assessment of
the climate change policy discretion inherent in existing federal legislation
and to develop a coordinated plan for exercising it.
This Article highlights the need for such an initiative and proposes a
framework for carrying it out. Part I focuses on the dysfunctional effects
litigation designed to force agencies into regulating greenhouse gas
emissions under existing laws, what I call “mitigation litigation,” is likely
to have on agency policy development. As strong proponents of
mitigation litigation have described their agenda, it is simply that “we
must launch a thousand arrows immediately.”10 And they have been
launched. For example, with over $6 million of funding already
committed, the Center for Biological Diversity recently formed the
Climate Law Institute to, among other things, “establish legal precedents
requiring existing environmental laws such as the Clean Air Act,
Endangered Species Act, National Environmental Policy Act, Clean Water
Act, and the California Environmental Quality Act to be fully
implemented to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.”11 Even disregarding
the inherently poor attributes of litigation for making national policy in
general—i.e., that it is not transparent, it limits public participation, it is
piecemeal, it can lead to inconsistent results, it takes a long time to reach
conclusion, etc.—mitigation litigation is an especially awful platform for
developing national climate change policy. Using the Endangered Species
Act as a case study, I argue that, while it has pushed a few agencies into
examining the role of existing authorities, mitigation litigation in the long
run will lead to an uncoordinated and ineffective climate change policy.
Existing legislation, if creatively applied within the bounds of permissible
agency statutory interpretation, offers many opportunities for agencies to
pursue mitigation and adaptation policies, but not all such opportunities
language . . . reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall
such obsolescence.”)
10
Anna T. Moritz et al., Biodiversity Baking and Boiling: Endangered Species Act
Turning Down the Heat, 44 TULSA L. REV. 205, 230 (2008).
11
Center for Biological Diversity, Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity
Announces Climate Law Institute, Dedicates $17 Million to Combat Global Warming
(Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2009/climatelaw-institute-02-12-2009.html. One of the co-authors of Moritz et al. is the Director of
the Center’s Climate Law Institute, and another co-author is a staff member of the Center.
See Moritz et al., supra note 10, at 205 n.n.aa1—aaa1.
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necessarily should be employed to the maximum an agency’s policy
discretion might allow. The pursuit of mitigation litigation against federal
agencies has been designed to push them into emissions mitigation
regulation “because it’s there,” with no clear vision of how to do so at the
agency level and no plan for how to coordinate a government-wide
climate change policy initiative that includes both mitigation and
adaptation.
Targeting agencies with this kind of mitigation litigation forces the
federal government to build a mitigation policy through ad hoc, agencyby-agency litigation. To be sure, in the George W. Bush Administration,
mitigation litigation under existing laws moved some agencies off center
and in the direction of formulating climate change policies. Indeed,
Massachusetts v. EPA may in retrospect be seen as the jolt needed to put
existing laws in play in the climate change policy dialogue. But
continuing down the mitigation litigation path will not bring about a
coherent, integrated, multi-scalar national climate change policy.
Part II of the Essay suggests a way out of this trap. I propose federal
legislation that would suspend for two years all causes of action against
agencies designed to force them to develop climate change policies under
existing legislation.
During this period agencies would conduct
coordinated statutory and policy studies, develop and finalize regulatory
proposals, and suggest legislative amendments, after which any litigation
about the final regulations would be channeled through a prescribed
judicial review forum. Necessary interim agency decisions, such as
preparation of environmental impact statements and issuance of permits,
would to the maximum extent practicable and permitted by law be made
contingent on the outcome of the rule promulgations. This process would
allow agencies to get out from under the perverse mitigation litigation
cloud while formulating climate change policy in a coordinated
government-wide process.
Our nation needs to climb Mount Mitigation, but it also needs to come
back down intact. A national climate change policy “map” is desperately
needed. It must chart paths for mitigation and adaptation. It must locate
new and existing authorities at all levels of government. Existing federal
laws will play a large role in charting overall mitigation and adaptation
objectives, but not if we stumble along step-by-step guided by piecemeal,
ad hoc mitigation litigation.
As important as citizen suit and
Administrative Procedure Act litigation has been to the development of
environmental policy over time, it is far too costly, time-consuming,
disjointed, and contentious a manner to formulate the kind of mitigation
policy the nation should expect our government to produce in the time
frame needed. Rather, the political stars seem aligned such that, if given
the chance, federal administrative agencies could pull off a coordinated
and probing examination of how best to use existing authorities toward
that end. My mitigation litigation suspension proposal is designed to give
them that opportunity.
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II. Mitigation Litigation – Pursuing Mitigation Because It’s There
I define mitigation litigation as any litigation effort designed to force
an agency to employ, or to not employ, existing regulatory authority to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions or limit a regulated action on the basis
of its greenhouse gas emissions.12 As the Climate Law Institute’s mission
statement suggests, the primary fronts for the initiative have been the
Clean Air Act, Endangered Species Act, and National Environmental
Policy Act. Thus far, however, the first wave of mitigation litigation has
produced very little mitigation regulation policy. To be sure, courts have
interpreted existing statutes to require agencies to integrate climate change
into decision making, but they have imposed no particular outcome. For
example, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA pushed the agency
toward regulating greenhouse gas automobile emissions under the Clean
Air Act, but observed that “EPA no doubt has significant latitude as to the
manner, timing, content and coordination of its regulations with those of
other agencies.”13 Clearly, the Climate Law Institute effort is designed to
focus the next litigation thrust on shaping the policies the EPA and other
agencies develop now that they know they cannot so easily avoid making
decisions about how to address climate change under their authorizing
statutes. As valuable as the first wave of mitigation litigation was for
putting existing laws on the climate change policy playing board,
however, the launching of the second wave portends only folly.
Nowhere is the potential fallout from this single-minded litigation-led
quest for the mitigation peak more evident than in the debate over how to
integrate the Endangered Species Act (ESA) into climate change policy. I
previously have outlined the scope of discretion agencies have under the
existing ESA to engage in climate change mitigation and adaptation
measures.14 Like the Clean Air Act and most other existing environmental
laws, the ESA does not mention climate change but is riddled with
provisions that offer varying ranges of discretion to agencies to formulate
climate change mitigation and adaptation policies, making it a sitting duck
for mitigation litigation. In particular, Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA provides:
12

There is, of course, a much broader range of climate change litigation. A useful
depiction of the breadth and depth of climate change litigation can be found at a chart
lawyers at the law firm of Arnold & Porter has prepared. See Michael B. Gerrard and J.
Cullen
Howe,
Climate
Change
Litigation
in
the
U.S.,
2009,
http://www.climatecasechart.com. The chart divides climate change into three primary
categories: statutory claims; common law claims; and public international claims. Within
the statutory claims category are claims to force the government to act, claims to stop
government action, and claims to regulate private conduct. My mitigation litigation
category corresponds most closely to the chart’s claims to force government to act
category.
13
549 U.S. at 533.
14
See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building
Bridges to the o-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008).
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Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency (…“action agency”) is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined . . . to
be critical . . . .15
The statute and implementing regulations build an elaborate procedure
for carrying out these consultations under which the agency proposing the
action (known as the “action agency”) must consult with, depending on
the species, either the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) through a series of steps designed to
predict the impact of the action on listed species, with the ultimate product
being a “biological opinion” from the FWS or NMFS “setting forth the
[agency’s] opinion, and a summary of the information on which the
opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects the species or its
critical habitat.”16
The substantive content for conducting the consultation analysis is
defined primarily in joint FWS/NMFS regulations. “Jeopardize” is
defined there as “to engage in an action that reasonably would be
expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of
both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing
the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species.”17 “Action” is
defined as “all activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or
carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or
upon the high seas.”18 “Effects of the action” include “the direct and
indirect effects of an action on the species or critical habitat, together with
the effects of other activities that are interrelated or interdependent with
that action, that will be added to the environmental baseline.”19 The
“indirect effects” are “those that are caused by the proposed action and are
later in time, but still are reasonably certain to occur.”20
On the one hand, greenhouse gas emissions and their climate change
consequences arguably can be plausibly fit into this framework.
Greenhouse gas emissions from actions carried out, funded, or authorized
by federal agencies contribute to tropospheric warming, the indirect
effects of which could at some later time adversely affect a protected
species. Although determining whether these effects actually occur may
15

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006). The provision also requires that “[i]n fulfilling
the requirements of this paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific and
commercial data available.” Id.
16
16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
17
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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be difficult to do reliably in particular scenarios, the point is that they
could occur.
On the other hand, there are considerable legal, scientific, and practical
difficulties with fitting climate change into the consultation framework at
the level of detail necessary to evaluate particular federal agency actions,
even relatively large or programmatic actions. Consider, for example, a
proposed coal-fired power plant in Florida and its effects on the polar bear
in the Arctic. The argument for applying the ESA goes as follows: the
power plant emits greenhouse gases (a direct effect of the action),
greenhouse gases are reasonably certain to warm the troposphere (an
indirect effect of the action), a warming troposphere is reasonably certain
to adversely alter ecological conditions for the polar bear, and it is
reasonably expected that such ecological changes will bring an end to the
polar bear as a species.
While that chain of events makes for an easy connect-the-dots story, in
fact any effort to link the individual plant’s emissions as the jeopardizing
agent for the polar bear species would meet obvious objections stemming
from the fact that all greenhouse gas emissions worldwide are subject to
the same causal analysis. Acting through an incredibly complex temporal
and spatial causal chain beginning over a century ago, all greenhouse gas
molecules are equally to blame for whatever impact climate change has on
a species. It is not possible, therefore, to “upscale” current emissions from
a particular source and “downscale” them in real time to a particular
impact on the ground, which is precisely what the Section 7 consultation
process would require the FWS and NMFS to do for every action funded,
carried out, or authorized by federal agencies.21 As a federal court
recently explained in deciding the causation requirement of Article III
standing had not been met in a claim that current greenhouse gas
emissions are causing a public nuisance:
The undifferentiated nature of greenhouse gas emissions from all
global sources and their worldwide accumulation over long periods
of time . . . makes clear that there is no realistic probability of
tracing any particular alleged effect of global warming to any
particular emissions by any specific person, entity, [or] group at
21

Moritz et al. argue that “[j]ust as there is no requirement to link the thinning of
any particular bald eagle egg to any particular molecule of DDT to demonstrate that
authorization of the use of DDT may result in a taking of bald eagles, there is no
requirement to link any particular molecule of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse
pollutant to the death of an individual bear.” Moritz et al, supra note 10, at 226. The
difference, of course, is that DDT is ingested by and toxic to bald eagles, whereas carbon
dioxide is not the lethal agent in the case of the polar bear. A complex spatially and
temporally attenuated causal chain involving the planet’s vast physical system exists
between the emission of a molecule of a greenhouse gas and its climate change effect on
a polar bear. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE CHALLENGES OF LINKING CARBON
EMISSIONS, ATMOSPHERIC GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS, GLOBAL WARMING, AND
CONSEQUENTIAL
IMPACTS,
(2008),
http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2008/
polarbear012308/pdf/Memo_to_FWS-Polar_Bears.PDF.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1623987

CLIMBIG MOUT MITIGATIO

73

any particular point in time….[T]he genesis of global warming is
attributable to numerous entities which individually and
cumulatively over the span of centuries created the effects….[I]t Is
not plausible to state which emissions—emitted by whom and at
what time in the last several centuries and at what place in the
world—“caused…alleged global warming related injuries.22
Every source of greenhouse gas emissions funded, carried out, or
authorized by a federal agency, therefore, is on the same footing with
respect to causation of jeopardy for a climate-threatened species. In other
words, going down the mitigation road with Section 7 would subject a vast
segment of our nation’s economy to greenhouse gas regulation under the
ESA, with no principled way of distinguishing between emission sources
for purposes of assigning “jeopardizing” causal status. Either all federal
actions would trigger jeopardy status and be subject to regulation by the
FWS and NMFS,23 or the FWS and NMFS would have to adopt arbitrary
thresholds for assigning jeopardy status (e.g., quantity or efficiency of
emissions) that would face difficult legal challenges.
Indeed, the suggestion that Section 7 could, in Clean Air Act like
fashion, arbitrarily apply only to “major” greenhouse gas emission sources
but lay off the small ones fundamentally misses the basic theme of the
jeopardy prohibition. Moritz et al. argue, for example, that the FWS and
NMFS “could set a threshold level for consultation, as long as it was
reasonable and sufficiently protective of listed species.”24 But they do not
point to authority in Section 7 or elsewhere in the ESA for differentiating
between sources in terms of legal status if there is no scientific basis for
differentiating the sources’ causal status. The regulatory definition of
jeopardy, they point out, is “to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both
the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild,”25 which they
suggest opens the door to an emissions level threshold. But consider how
“appreciably” would be measured once a species is in jeopardy of not
surviving and recovering. Jeopardy itself can be thought of as a threshold
the ESA prohibits federal agencies from crossing based on the status of the
species in question. After a species is listed, it is not the case that no
22

Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, No. C 08-1138 SBA, slip op. at
13 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009). The Fifth Circuit recently criticized this reasoning as
improperly conflating the merits of the nuisance claim with the causation requirement of
standing, in that the standing requirement “need not be as close as the proximate
causation needed to succeed on the merits of a tort claim.” Comer v. Murphy Oil USA,
No. 07-60756, slip op. at 5 (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 2009). No court has yet reached the merits of
such a claim.
23
Regulation by the FWS and NMFS comes in the form of the agencies specifying
“reasonable and prudent” alternatives to the action as proposed. See 16 U.S.C. §
1536(b)(3)(A). Presumably, in the climate change mitigation context this would mean
placing caps on emission levels. Proponents of this use of the ESA have yet to explain
how the FWS and NMFS would establish such caps for different sources.
24
Moritz et al., supra note 10, at 228.
25
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (emphasis added).
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further degradation of the species’ condition or its habitat is permitted.
Rather, the “incidental take authorization” procedures of Sections 7 and 10
allow public and private actions to cause harm and even death to
individuals of the species with FWS and NMFS approval, with the
jeopardy prohibition of Section 7 acting as a threshold of maximum
tolerance.26 Hence, in reality there is an increment of “likelihood of
survival and recovery” that additional federal and nonfederal actions erode
through these incidental take authorizations. At some point, that
increment is sufficiently eroded that the next action requiring incidental
take authorization would trigger a jeopardy finding regardless of its “size.”
In the polar bear’s case, in other words, conditions could reach the point
that the species can tolerate no additional net increase in emissions of
greenhouse gases without moving the likelihood of survival and recovery
dangerously close to zero. At that point, if we want to entertain this causal
story at the micro scale of discrete land uses, zero additional emissions of
greenhouse gases from any source could escape a jeopardy finding.
Moreover, the idea that the ESA can differentiate between “major” and
“minor” sources, regulating the former and leaving the latter outside the
scope of consultation, turns the “cumulative effects” problem on its head
in violation of Section 7. If Moritz et al. believe establishing causation is
not a problem for applying Section 7 to emissions from “major” sources,
then it follows that it also is not a problem for applying Section 7 to the
cumulative effects of “minor” sources.
Rarely does one hear
environmental protection interest groups lobby in favor of an exemption
from Section 7 for projects destroying under 20 acres of forest habitat of
an endangered bird, or for projects diverting under 10 acre feet of water
for an endangered fish, or for projects releasing under 10 pounds of
pesticides for an endangered reptile. I wouldn’t either. Why, then, would
anyone be comfortable regulating only “major” sources of greenhouse gas
emissions under the ESA, other than as an expedient to regulate major
sources of greenhouse gas emissions and avoid the political and legal
complications of regulating all causal sources? Why would greenhouse
gas emissions from, say, hundreds of thousands of farms receiving federal

26

Section 9 of the ESA requires that all persons, including all private and public
entities subject to federal jurisdiction, avoid committing “take” of listed species of fish
and wildlife.16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1). For a description of the cases developing the legal
standards for what constitutes “take,” see Alan M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking
Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 65
(2001) Steven P. Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, When Do Land Use Activities “Take”
Listed Wildlife Under ESA Section 9 and the “Harm” Regulation?, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 207 (Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert
Irvin eds., 2002). Sections 7 (for federal agency actions) and 10 (for actions not subject to
Section 7) establish a procedure and criteria for FWS to approve “incidental take” of
listed species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4) and 1539(a)(1). “Incidental take,” although not
explicitly defined in a specific statutory provision, is described in section 10 of the statute
as take that is “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise
lawful activity.” Id. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
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subsidies not cross the jeopardy threshold but emissions from a single
large power plant would?
Moritz et al. overlook that Section 7 regulations specifically prohibit
this distortion by requiring that cumulative impacts be considered. The
precise question under review in a Section 7 consultation is whether “the
action, taken together with cumulative effects, is likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of listed species.”27 Cumulative effects are “those
effects of future State or private activities, not involving Federal activities,
that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area of the Federal
action subject to consultation,”28 and the action area includes “all areas to
be affected directly or indirectly by the Federal action and not just the
immediate area involved in the action.”29 This means that for greenhouse
gas emission sources, if Section 7 is applied to them, the action area is the
entire planet and thus all greenhouse emissions from all sources subject to
United States jurisdiction anywhere in the world would have to be
included in the cumulative effects component of the consultation.30
Rather obviously, no source, no matter how small, could escape a jeopardy
finding under this causal reasoning once the cumulative effects sources are
factored into the consultation. In short, there is no way under Section 7 to
have your cake and eat it too; if one believes greenhouse gas emissions
can be regulated under Section 7 notwithstanding the tenuous causal
theory supporting that view, every source of greenhouse gas emissions the
federal government carries out, funds, or authorizes will, because of how
cumulative effects and the action area are defined, be found to reduce
appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of all climatethreatened listed species in the world.
My suggestion that this application of Section 7 is not a practical use
of the ESA and should be avoided to the extent permitted under the
agencies’ discretion has been met with accusations that I am
“rationaliz[ing] for a preferred policy approach rather than a meritorious
legal argument.”31 This critique seems out of place with the recognition,
endorsed by a long list of environmental law professors, that “there is a
legitimate debate to be had over how well the current structure of the ESA
serves to address climate change in general, or climate change impacts on
listed species in particular,” and that “it is unclear whether consultation
would halt…power plants, require significant changes to the projects, or

27

50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4). A consultation thus must “evaluate the effects of the
action and cumulative effects on the listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(3). Id. §
402.02.
28
50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
29
Id.
30
The ESA applies broadly to all federal, state, local, tribal, and private entities,
including individuals, “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 16 U.S.C. §
1532(13).
31
Moritz et al., supra note 10 at 227.
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have no impact at all.”32 Other legal commentary recognizes the
difficulties of establishing the necessary causation under the ESA and
suggests that either my or the Moritz et al. perspective finds plausible
support in ESA law.33 Proponents of using the ESA as the lynchpin of our
nation’s greenhouse gas regulation regime thus seem no less susceptible to
the charge of preferring a policy outcome than am I. Moritz et al. suggest,
for example, that “[o]nly by fully implementing the ESA to help avoid
rapid and catastrophic climate change can we keep it the strongest and
most relevant biodiversity protection statute that the world has ever
seen,”34 and that “[t]here is absolutely no reason why we should not
require these agencies to adopt all feasible measures to reduce emissions
immediately through the Section 7 process,”35 but that is just their
“preferred policy approach.”
I make no bones about my “preferred policy approach;”it is to promote
the ESA as one of the nation’s focused climate change adaptation statutes,
for which I argue the ESA is especially well designed, and leave
greenhouse gas emission regulation to agencies that are better equipped at
pollution control science and technology, such as the EPA.36 The question
boils down to whether my “preferred policy approach” fits within the
range of discretion the FWS and the NMFS enjoy under Section 7; that is,
whether courts would find the agencies’ position that causation cannot be
established within the meaning of Section 7 is a reasonable interpretation
32

Eric Biber & Cynthia Drew, Stopping the Conversation: Amended ESA Section
7 Regulations Put Species At Risk, 36 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 139, 147 (2009)
33
See ROBERT MELTZ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., USE OF THE POLAR
BEAR LISTING TO FORCE REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: THE LEGAL
ARGUMENTS 3–5 (2008) (laying out the legal basis for both positions); Matthew Gerhart,
Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: The Difficulty of Proving Causation,
36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 167, 171–82 (2009) (detailing the causation obstacles to using section
7 to regulate greenhouse gas emissions). But see Ari N. Sommer, Note, Taking the Pit
Bull Off the Leash: Siccing the Endangered Species Act on Climate Change, 36 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 273, 303–04, 307–08 (2009) (arguing in the extreme that there is no
significant obstacle to proving causation in a claim that greenhouse gas emissions cause
take of an identifiable member of a species in violation of section 9).
34
Moritz et al., supra note 10 at 230.
35
Id. at 225.
36
Finding the “assertion that scientists and managers within the Services do not
have the expertise to analyze greenhouse gas emission in section 7 consultations
particularly puzzling,” Moritz et al. presumably believe that the FWS and NMFS either
already have or should be empowered with the pollution modeling and control
technology design expertise needed to regulate the nation’s sources of greenhouse gas
pollutants. Id. at 227. While I agree that, with sufficient time and funding, the FWS and
the NMFS could duplicate EPA’s pollution regulation expertise, I am suggesting that it
makes no practical sense to do so as a means of engaging the ESA in the nation’s climate
change policy strategy when so much more can be done using the agencies’ existing
capacities toward assisting species in adapting to climate change. In any event, the fact of
the matter is that, at present, neither the FWS nor the NMFS purports to have or exercise
the expertise needed to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the industrial and
agricultural complex of the entire United States, which is what going down the path
Moritz et al. propose would require.
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of the statute entitled to judicial deference. I believe a “meritorious legal
argument” can be made that they would.
To be sure, under my approach the FWS and NMFS would have no
room to dodge the ESA’s mandate at least to consider the effects of
climate change on actions and species as part of the environmental
baseline required to be accounted for in all consultations under Section
7.37 That is, after all, a necessary ingredient of using the ESA to assist
species adaptation. The mitigation litigation cause wants much more,
however, and the reaction by the Bush Administration was to launch a
counter-offensive that sent the question of the ESA and climate policy
spiraling out of control.
The pushback began in full force in May 2008, when the FWS
promulgated a final rule listing the polar bear as threatened based on
factors that included the impacts of climate change on Arctic sea ice.38
Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne stressed at the time that the
listing would not provide a basis for using the ESA to regulate greenhouse
gas (GHG) emission sources.39 The FWS also issued interim and final
section 4(d) rules for the polar bear, exempting from section 9 take
prohibitions any activity already exempt or authorized under the Marine
Mammal Protection Act and, for any activity outside of Alaska, also
exempting all takes incidental to a lawful purpose.40 The unspoken
purpose of the latter approach undoubtedly was to cut off claims that GHG
emissions sources outside of Alaska are causing unauthorized take of the
polar bear. In tandem with that, the Department of the Interior also issued
a memorandum explaining it will not consider GHG emissions in
consultations about the polar bear or other species listed due to climate
threats because tracing causation is, according to the highly respected
United States Geological Survey, scientifically impossible.41
37

See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322, 368-70 (E.D.
Cal. 2007) (The FWS must consider the effects of climate change on actions regulated
under the ESA). The environmental baseline in section 7 consultations refers to “the past
and present impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in
the action area, the anticipated impacts of all proposed federal projects in the action area
that have already undergone…consultation, and the impact of State or private actions
which are contemporaneous with the consultation in process.” See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. It
is against this baseline that the action under review is evaluated to determine its
incremental effect. The impacts of climate change attributable to those other actions,
therefore, should be included in that baseline. The baseline analysis operates at a macro
level—i.e., all that matters is that the baseline takes climate change impacts into account,
not that it assign responsibility to specific sources.
38
See 73 Fed. Reg. 28212 (May 15, 2008).
39
News Release, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Secretary Kempthorne Announces
Decision to Protect Polar Bears under Endangered Species Act (May 14, 2008).
40
See 73 Fed. Reg. 28306 (May 15, 2008) (interim rule); 73 Fed. Reg. 76249
(Dec. 16, 2008) (final rule).
41
See Solicitor’s Opinion, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor,
Guidance on the Applicability of the Endangered Species Act’s Consultation
Requirements to Proposed Actions Involving the Emission of Greenhouse Gases (Oct. 3,
2008); Memorandum from the Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, The
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The FWS and NMFS later followed up on that position by
promulgating new section 7(a)(2) consultation regulations designed to,
among other things, preclude consideration of greenhouse emissions in
consultations. Culminating one of the most controversial rulemakings in
the history of ESA implementation, in December 2008, the FWS and
NMFS promulgated final rules revising various features of the Section 7
consultation regulations. The changes, too extensive to cover and assess
in detail here, fell into three categories: (1) revised and new definitions for
the causation and effects analyses; (2) revisions to applicability designed
to preclude consideration of GHG emissions in consultations; and (3)
streamlined consultations through a shift in decision authority to action
agencies. Some of the changes merely codified existing conditions, such
as a new provision limiting consultations to discretionary actions. But
some had the potential to radically alter consultation practice. Some
significant changes included: indirect effects are limited to those effects
that occur later in time for which the proposed action is an “essential
cause;”42if an effect will occur whether or not the proposed action takes
place, it is not an indirect effect.;43 indirect effects must be reasonably
likely to occur based on “clear and substantial information;”44for actions
not anticipated to cause take, no consultation is necessary if the effects are
manifested through “global processes” that cannot be reliably predicted or
measured, have an insignificant impact, or pose only a remote risk;45for
actions not anticipated to cause take, no consultation is necessary if the
effects are not capable of being measured in a way that permits
“meaningful evaluation;”46 and action agencies will determine for
themselves whether, under these new standards, formal consultation is
necessary.
The rule attracted considerable controversy: tens of thousands of
comments were filed on the proposed rule, and litigation was filed
immediately to challenge the final rule. Many environmental strategists
outlined ways the Obama Administration could, through executive action
or in concert with Congress, swiftly nullify the rule. In March 2009
President Obama ordered FWS and NMFS to review the rules and
authorized other federal agencies “to follow the prior longstanding
consultation and concurrence practices.”47 Soon thereafter Congress
passed legislation allowing the agencies to withdraw the polar bear section
Challenges of Linking Carbon Emissions, Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
Global Warming, and Consequential Impacts (May 14, 2008). The Department in the
Obama Administration has not rescinded that guidance.
42
73 Fed. Reg. 76249, 76287 (Dec. 16, 2008).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. § 402.03(b)(2).
46
Id. § 402.03(b)(3)(i).
47
See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Memorandum for the
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Re: The Endangered Species Act (Mar. 3,
2009).
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4(d) rule and the consultation rule with no notice and comment
procedures,48 which the agencies did for the consultation rule effective
May 4, 2009.49 Other than raise a fuss about the Bush Administration
consultation rule, however, neither Congress nor the Obama
Administration has shown any interest in dragging the ESA into the war
on greenhouse gas emissions. Nothing in the legislation allowing the
agencies to overturn the rules or in the agencies’ statement accompanying
the decision to overturn the consultation rule so much as mentions using
the ESA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, all indications thus
far suggest that interest groups pursuing mitigation litigation under the
ESA will not like the Obama Administration's position much more than
they did the Bush Administration's: Deputy Secretary of the Department
of the Interior David Hayes told senators during his confirmation hearing
that the endangered species law is ill-suited for addressing greenhouse gas
emissions; Tom Strickland, the Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife and
Parks overseeing the ESA, said the same at his hearing; and, more directly
to the point, FWS spokesman Josh Winchell said in February 2009 that
“we have zero legislative authority to regulate carbon emissions. That is
just not what we do. With the polar bear, the science definitely pointed to
climate change, but that does not all of a sudden give us the authority to
address the underlying cause, which is carbon emissions.”50 Putting those
words into action, on May 8, 2009, Interior Secretary Salazar announced
the agency’s decision not to rescind the polar section bear section 4(d)
rule, proclaiming that “the Endangered Species Act is not the proper
mechanism for controlling our nation’s carbon emissions.”51
The point of recounting this history and the complexities of applying
the ESA to greenhouse gas emissions is that there has to be a better way of
going about integrating existing laws into a national climate change policy
than having interest groups and federal agencies flail about in piecemeal
litigation and defensive rulemakings. Federal agencies must act, but they
ought to be able to act at least initially without the specter of mitigation
litigation looming. A coordinated, multi-scalar national climate change
policy is too important to have in place, and soon, to allow it to be forged
by courts interpreting existing laws through ad hoc litigation around the

48

2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, div. E, tit. IV, § 429, 123
Stat. 544, 749.
49
See 74 Fed. Reg. 20421 (May 4, 2009)
50
Greenwire, Endangered Species: Some See EPA’s Climate Proposal Prodding
Interior on ESA (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/
print/2009/04/23/4; see also Alan Kovski, Interior ominee Agrees Climate Change Fits
Poorly in Endangered Species Rules, 40 Env’t Rep. (Bureau of National Affairs,
Arlington, VA) 605, 622 (Mar. 20, 2009).
51
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, News Release, Salazar Retains Conservation Rule
for Polar Bears, Underlines Need for Comprehensive Energy and Climate Legislation
(May
8,
2009),
available
at
http://www.fws.gov/news/NewsReleases/
showNews.cfm?newsId=20FB90B6-A188-DB01-04788E0892D91701.
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nation. In the next section, I propose a legislative suspension of mitigation
litigation to facilitate development of such a policy.

III. Designing a Systematic Climate Change Policy Development Process
President Obama’s appointment of Carol Browner as White House
Coordinator of Energy and Climate Policy is an important first step in
forging a coordinated national climate change policy, but neither President
Obama nor Ms. Browner can do much to stem mitigation litigation while
she works toward that end. Congress must step in for that part. As
unlikely as it is that Congress would choose to offend the lawyers and
interest groups pursuing mitigation litigation or to appear to be limiting
public participation, the following proposal outlines what I believe is a
sensible approach to suspending mitigation litigation while federal
agencies are required to develop coordinated rulemakings for activating
existing laws to contribute to climate change mitigation and litigation.

A. Suspending Climate Change Litigation Causes of Action
Step one of my proposal is for Congress and President Obama to enact
legislation suspending mitigation litigation for two years. This can be
accomplished one of two ways. One is to enact an omnibus provision
preventing any new or continued litigation using citizen suit or
Administrative Procedure Act causes of action to pursue mitigation
litigation claims, that is to force any federal agency to regulate or not to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions or to develop or revise policies with
respect to whether and how to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. A more
aggressive approach would be, in addition, to suspend federal judicial
jurisdiction over all such claims and remedies, so as to prevent other types
of litigation (e.g., common law claims) from somehow leading to judicial
orders violating the intent of the suspension. Alternatively, or in tandem,
the legislation could direct federal agencies not to develop or revise
climate change policies until they have completed the policy development
process outlined below.

B. Defining Climate Change Statutory Discretion Under Existing Laws
At the commencement of the suspension period, every federal agency
would have six months to produce for Congress and the President a report
(a) examining all potential authorities in existing laws it administers that
could support climate change mitigation and adaptation measures and the
extent of discretion available to the agency under each provision, (b)
detailing the agency’s decisions about how to exercise those authorities
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within its range of discretion, (c) developing, through an advanced notice
of proposed rulemaking, draft regulations for implementing the agency’s
vision, and (d) recommending statutory amendments where necessary to
provide more definitive or necessary support for policies the agency
believes should be pursued but for which existing law does not provide
authority.

C. Coordinated Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation Rule
Promulgation
In the next six months of the suspension period, a task force appointed
pursuant to the terms of the legislation (e.g., relevant Department and
agency heads) and chaired by the White House Coordinator will use the
reports compiled by each agency and comments on the advanced notices
of rulemakings to develop a coordinated national policy for existing laws
and will evaluate each agency’s draft regulations to recommend any
changes necessary to allow the agency most usefully to contribute to the
policy. During the second year of the suspension period each agency then
will propose regulations and complete promulgation by the end of the twoyear suspension period using standard APA rule promulgation procedures.
During the second year the task force will also evaluate the statutory
amendment recommendations of each agency and report on them to
Congress, and it will also outline policies for integrating state, local, and
tribal policy initiatives.

D. Interim Decisions
During the suspension period, agencies of course will need to
implement existing laws, such as by issuing or denying permits, preparing
environmental impact statements, and carrying out, funding, and
authorizing other actions. To the extent permissible by law, all such
actions will be contingent on the rules adopted from the process, with
provisions made for modification of permits, funding conditions, and
project design to bring all actions into compliance with the new
regulations as soon as practical. Federal agencies and non-federal actors
receiving federal funding or authorization may during this interim period
design actions to be consistent with what the federal agency believes is
likely to comply with its regulations. For any project that cannot legally
include this contingency and which is not voluntarily designed to
anticipate compliance requirements, the duration or magnitude of the
agency action (e,g., the permit period or funding level) will be the lowest
allowed by applicable law so as to ensure that the new rules, once in
effect, can be applied to the next discretionary decision whether to renew
or revise the action.
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E. Judicial Review
To ensure uniformity of judicial treatment of the rules
produced from the process and all decisions made during the suspension
period that trigger the interim contingency condition, judicial review of all
rules promulgated through the process and any claims collaterally
challenging the new rules (e.g., a permit challenge contesting the scope of
the new rules) will be conducted directly in the D.C. Circuit. The review
standard for agency interpretations of the existing statutory authorities on
which the new rules are based will require the court to apply the Chevron
standard in all cases.

IV. Conclusion
I agree with the perspective that climate change requires that we will
likely need to “launch a thousand arrows,” but I do not agree that we must
or should do so “immediately.” Better, I believe, to take aim first, pull on
the bow with deliberation, and hit the target. To use another metaphor,
better to draw up a good map before climbing up Mount Mitigation. Yet
the unchecked continuation of mitigation litigation involves using no map
at all. It was by all accounts necessary to engage in mitigation litigation to
push the Bush Administration into acknowledging the need to integrate
existing laws into climate change policy, but the operating assumption
ought to be that this catalyst function is no longer necessary in the Obama
Administration working in unison with Congress in its current political
composition. Yet this is not necessarily an unlimited window either
politically or physically—action is needed, and it is time to force agencies
to act. But that force ought not come by way of ad hoc litigation. Rather,
Congress and President Obama should take the bull by the horns by
stopping mitigation litigation and requiring federal agencies to get their
heads out of the sand. One measure without the other will produce a far
less coherent national climate change policy, but putting both in place will
allow us to climb Mount Mitigation with a map to get us up and back
down with a purpose, not just because it’s there.
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